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Introduction
In  absolutist  Prussia  in  the  year  1784,  Kant  published  a  short  essay  in
response to the question ‘What is enlightenment?’ This text contributed to a
debate  put  forward  by  the  journal  Berlinische  Monatsschrift,  which  had
initially posed this question to a (mostly academic) public. In relation to
Kant's major works,  such as the three  Critiques,  this  text certainly has a
minor status. It does not focus on philosophical justifications, it is polemical
in style, it is historical rather than a priori, and it is also, in some passages, a
great piece of rhetoric. This absence of meticulous academic rigor, on the
other hand, allows for a much more spontaneous and less refined reaction
from the reader than, say, the attempt to understand the  Critique of Pure
Reason.  It  is  no coincidence that  this  essay should have  become one of
Kant's  most  famous  texts.  Yet,  it  would  be  a  mistake  to  say  that  this
peripheral  text  is  so  well-known  just  because  it  lacks  the  philosophical
content or weight of Kant's other, more central writings. On the contrary: as
a more casual  text,  this  essay has to  be seen as an expression of Kant's
philosophical  insights.  It  is  like a  casual remark that often enough gives
away more of the real character of a person than any elaborate, intellectual
self-presentation. 
This is, at least, the way I will treat Kant's answer to the question
‘What is enlightenment?’ I want to show how several key concepts of this
minor  work,  in  particular  the idea  of  humanity’s ascension  to  a  state  of
‘majority’ or ‘maturity’, are related to some of the central ideas of Kant’s
2critical  philosophy.  For  Kant,  the  answer  to  the  question,  ‘What  is
enlightenment?’,  has to focus on reason's  outstanding ability to judge by
itself,  that  is  (in  Kantian  vocabulary),  to  judge  autonomously.  His
philosophical corpus can now be seen as an extensive articulation of what it
means  to  understand  human  reasoning  as  an  essentially  autonomous
capacity.  Thus,  by  tracking  the  connections  of  Kant's  conception  of
enlightenment to the more theoretical framework of his major works, I want
to shed light on some of the complications that arise when one tries to spell
out  the  conditions,  consequences  and  implications  of  this  focal  ideal  of
Western modernity. It  will  turn out that one recurring problem of Kant's
theorization is the relationship between the alleged autonomy of reason to
its natural origins: how can reason be, at once, autonomous and natural?1
The two senses of Unmündigkeit
Kant famously opens his text giving a direct answer to the question asked:
Enlightenment, he states, is ‘man's release from his self-incurred minority’.
The English translation hides that this seemingly positive definition is in
fact just a negation. The German word Kant uses,  Unmündigkeit, signifies
the absence of Mündigkeit. But what is Mündigkeit? It can be translated as
‘maturity’, ‘accountability', ‘responsibility', ‘self-ownership' or, what seems
to be the best fit for Kant's specific use, ‘autonomy'. Accordingly, one can
find  several  English  versions  of  the  opening  sentence,  in  which
enlightenment  is  defined  as  being  man's  release,  variously,  from
‘immaturity’,  'tutelage',  or  ‘minority’.2 This  linguistic  difference  between
German and English allows for an interesting problematization of Kant's
initial definition of Enlightenment. The two most common translations of
Unmündigkeit, ‘immaturity' and ‘minority', belong to contexts which differ
1 There is currently a fair amount of debate on the question of the ‘normativity’ of nature, 
or ‘second nature’ (cf. Thompson 2008; McDowell 2000). This short text might be seen 
as an investigation into the Kantian origins of this discussion.
2 Thanks to Brandon Absher, who pointed this out and thus helped me substantially.
3in a telling way.3 
The first English term, ‘immaturity', expresses a normative judgment
about the mental or general constitution of a person. An immature person is,
for example, not willing to assume responsibility for what he or she has
done. Even though it is possible to extend this judgment to persons old and
young, its governing norm seems to be derived from an implicit ideal line of
moral  and mental  development  in  human beings.  An immature  person –
whether  a child or not – behaves childishly, irrationally, just in the way
grown-ups should not behave. The point here is that this moral judgment of
maturity  has  an  indirect  link  to  the  normal,  natural  path  of  human
development. It can function as a normative criticism only if the persons
accused  of  immaturity  actually  could  display  the  signs  of  self-control,
respect and responsibility which are tied to this concept. It is assumed that
they  have  at  least  the  capacity  to  act  as  they  should  act,  that  they  are
‘mature’  in  the  sense  of  ‘fully  developed’.  Otherwise,  the  judgment  of
immaturity would lose its normative force. We will see that this mixture of
naturalism  and  normativity  plays  an  important  part  in  Kant's  global
qualification of the Enlightenment. 
This meaning of Unmündigkeit as immaturity has to be distinguished
from the other, purely legalistic meanings of ‘minority’ as ‘being a minor’.
A minor, in this second sense, is a citizen excluded from certain public or
legal  affairs,  most  often  due to  his  or  her  age.  This  exclusion  might  be
justified with a moral reasoning using the same mixture of naturalism and
normativity discussed above. It can be said, for example, that persons below
a certain age are simply incapable of fulfilling the demands required of by
full citizenship.4 Such an explanation, however, is not coextensive with the
3 The  German  word  Unmündigkeit is  ambiguous  with  respect  to  the  two  meanings,
‘minor’ and ‘immature’.  This is why we find diverging English versions of the first
opening sentence, with Kant's definition of Enlightenment being translated as ‘man's
release from his self-incurred tutelage’ (Lewis White Beck), ‘man's emergence from his
self-imposed immaturity’, and, finally, as ‘man's release from his self-incurred minority’
(Mary Gregor). I will refer to Mary Gregor’s translation, which renders Unmündigkeit
in English as ‘minority’.
4 This sort of wisdom even found its way into the Constitution of the United States, 
which states that a only citizens thirty-five years old or older are eligible for the office. 
(Art. II, Sec. I.)
4juridical  distinction  itself.  One  might  well  be  legally  excluded  from the
sphere of public affairs  and yet  be ‘mature’ in the sense of having fully
developed  the  capacity  of  rational  self-control.  We could  judge  such  a
person as being ‘premature', thus indicating that the person has reached a
level  of  maturity  well  ahead of  his  or  her  peers.  Nevertheless,  the legal
status of minority would still hold.
Now, the  German word  Unmündigkeit does  not  allow for  such a
dissociation. A certain behavior is unmündig if it resembles the doings of a
child, if it does not display the signs of mature, rational self-control. But you
could also call a person unmündig in the second, formal sense. In this use,
the Unmündigkeit describes a legal state, an exclusion due purely to formal
criteria.  As  a  consequence,  the  term  Unmündigkeit  requires  a  certain
unpacking with respect to its proper meaning. 
My thesis is that Kant's characterization of the Enlightenment relies
on this double meaning.  Kant tells his contemporaries that they do not live
up  to  the  possibilities  offered  by  the  Enlightenment,  and  such  a  charge
always includes two separate judgments: 1) that a new space for action and
thinking has been opened up, historically, promising new and better forms
of life, and 2) that this new area could be occupied immediately, if only
some of the obstacles could be removed.  The historical  transition of the
Enlightenment is equivalent to the formal sense of  Mündigkeit: the human
being has finally reached a state where it has outgrown any dependence on
an  exterior  ‘tutelage'.  The  civilization  of  the  age  of  Enlightenment  has
grown up; it is now set free. But what is lacking, according to Kant, is the
actual use of these newly gained possibilities: humankind as a whole still
behaves immaturely, it still shies away from the new terrain. The ambiguity
of the German Mündigkeit allows Kant to present this double diagnosis with
great rhetorical and moral force: If we are still  unmündig  in the sense of
that we don’t behave ‘maturely enough’, and if Mündigkeit is a state that has
already been reached formally, then ‘us’ – that is, Kant's contemporaries –
are all that is left to bear the blame for this ‘self-incurred minority’.
5The Paradoxical Nature of Emancipation
How should  we  understand  this  thesis?  The  use  of  unmündig in  Kant's
writing is, of course, highly metaphorical. The legal meaning of this term
can only be applied to ‘humanity’ as a whole as an analogy, since there is no
such thing as a godlike legislator who releases the human species into the
formal  state  of  majority. But  there  is  something very  much akin  to  this
sovereignty in  Kant's  text  – Nature.  Kant's  use of  unmündig rests  on an
implicit  understanding  of  nature  and  of  reason's  relation  to  it,  an
understanding that is more explicitly stated in other ‘minor’ writings of the
same period,  like the  ‘Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan
Purpose’.  Kant sees Nature in the double-role of creator and legislator: it is
both the source of our capacity to reason, and the normative standard of its
proper application. The difficulties with understanding Kant's ‘definition’ of
enlightenment, then, turn out to be the difficulties of this overloaded, if not
paradoxical, concept of nature. 
A closer look at ‘What is Enlightenment?’ might help to develop this
point. In the first paragraph, Kant introduces the now well-known slogan
Sapere aude!:  ‘Dare to  be wise!’ (AK 8:35).  Slogans or mottoes were a
commonly-used  device  to  convey  the  goal  or  aspirations  which  unite  a
group of people – a family, a university, even a nation. The Enlightenment,
Kant is implicitly saying, is a movement driven by a group of people who
dare  to  emancipate  themselves,  who dare  to  think  for  themselves.  Their
courage distinguishes them from the immature masses, whose minority is
‘self-imposed’,  Kant  explains,  because  ‘its  cause  lies  not  in  lack  of
understanding, but in lack of resolve and courage to use it [understanding]
without guidance from another’ (AK 8:35).
This rhetoric of a daring avant-garde raises the question of why this
group does, in fact, need to unite under such a reassuring motto. Why is it
daring, why does it require courage to emancipate oneself? Instead of an
explanation,  the  following  paragraph  offers  a  list  of  all  of  the
self-proclaimed guardians  who aspire  to  hinder  us from living up to  the
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course,  points  at  the  usual  suspects:  the  church,  the  physician  or,  more
generally, the unquestioned authority of  ‘a book’. This passage still echoes
with  the  feud  between  the  protestant  church,  to  which  the  pietist  Kant
belonged,  and  the  Roman  Catholic  Church.  And  it  also  alludes  to  the
growing dissatisfaction with absolutist regimes throughout Europe.
Given this list, we might conclude that courage is required, because
all these authorities were actively suppressing our minds. But even though
the whole text is a plea for the freedom of academic, ‘public’5 exchange,
Kant  does  not  develop  a  theory  of  ideological  oppression.  He  remains
focused  on  defining  what  Enlightenment  is,  and  from  this  perspective,
courage is not only required to fend off the influence of others, it is also, and
above  all,  essential  in  the  struggle  of  the  rational  subject  with  itself.
According to Kant, the real problem is that we, as reasonable individuals, let
those self-proclaimed supervisors take over too easily. We find it a burden,
he claims, to think for ourselves; and these people readily jump in to release
us from this  burden. We must not put the blame entirely on them. Kant
wants us to see that we are also part of the problem, since it is so much more
comfortable  to  bow to these  authorities—so comfortable  that  we are,  as
Kant explicitly says, even ready to ‘pay’ for our self-incurred minority (AK
8:35).
Why is it then, in Kant's opinion, so much more comfortable to live
under  the  guidance  of  others?  Kant  offers  us  a  short,  but  significant
explanation: ‘it is because of laziness and cowardice that so great a part of
humankind,  after  nature  has  long  since  emancipated  them  from  other's
people  direction  (naturaliter  maiorennes),  nevertheless  gladly  remains
minors  for  life’ (AK  8:35).  At  a  first  glance,  this  phrase  seems  just  to
reinstate the diagnosed lack of courage. But the subordinate clause gives a
5 Kant does not use the word 'public' in this modern sense. His distinction between 
‘public’ and ‘private’ in the essay is notoriously puzzling, since the word ‘private’ refers
to the exercise of thought within the state, which, as a result of this, remains 
unconditionally bound to and by its laws and principles. The only real ‘public’ sphere is 
the sphere of academic discourse, which Kant regards, in modern terms, as a private 
business. (‘Think what you want, but obey!’)
7hint as to why courage is required: laziness and cowardice become the only
reasons left for the deplorable state of affairs  after the natural constraints
on  thinking  have  been  lifted.  Thinking,  be  it  major/mature  or
minor/immature, requires some sort of guidance for Kant. This is scarcely
controversial  in  the  case  of  a  natural  state  of  minority, as  in  childhood.
When  Kant  talks  about  ‘other  people’s  direction’,  he  is  alluding  to  the
natural fact that the first steps into the thinking world can never be made
alone. To put it in a more modern language: the growing child, in order to
develop its cognitive capacities, has to be led by the grown-ups it interacts
with. The child acquires the necessary capacities only by the means of a
joint  attention  and  interaction  with  individuals  who are  more  competent
(Tomasello 1999). But Kant extends the requisite of guidance well beyond
the  development  of  the child.  The movement to  majority  is  a  shift  with
respect to the source of the guidelines and principles, but not with respect to
its very necessity.  The grown-up is not devoid of (the need for) guidance,
but rather has to guide herself. And this seems to be, for Kant, a hard and
mostly  unrewarding  practice.  Establishing  your  own  guidelines  is  a
cumbersome task,  one that will  most likely put you in an uncomfortable
confrontation with those people who are used to treating you like a child.
The idea that the (grown-up) human mind is still in need of guidance,
and the corresponding notion that, in order to be called ‘free’, thinking has
to  guide  itself,  is  central  to  Kant's  entire  philosophy. This  connection of
freedom, thinking and the idea of self-legislation laid the foundation for the
rise of the German Idealism and its speculative force. Why is it necessary to
exercise a philosophical  critique, to launch into a critical examination into
the powers of reason? The very first sentence of Kant's  Critique of Pure
Reason  explains that reason has the ‘peculiar fate’ of being ‘burdened by
questions which … it is not able to ignore, but which … it is also not able to
answer. The perplexity into which it thus falls is not due to any fault of its
own’ (A VII). A critique,  then,  forces  itself  upon us  because  the  use  of
reason is  not  self-evident.  Lacking natural guidance,  reason can run into
paradoxes  and  perplexities,  thus  ‘precipitat[ing]  itself  into  darkness  and
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metaphysics’ (A VII) The valuable instrument of reason has to be used the
right way, or it might render itself useless, possibly even destroy itself. 
It  is  important  to  distinguish  this  position  from,  for  example,
anthropological explanations of the human being’s lack of freedom. There
might be a human desire to be guided, a sort of psychological tendency to
regression,  but that is not Kant's point.  Rather, Kant is  claiming that the
power  of  reason  is  of  this  'peculiar'  sort,  a  sort  which  needs  reflexive
guidance in order to function properly. This is not a psychological demand,
but a logical prerequisite which establishes a normative conception of mind.
Accordingly, Kant's critical philosophy sets out to determine the measures
and standards to which a proper use of reason should conform in order to
avoid confusions and endless dialectical quarrels.
In  ‘What  is  Enlightenment?’,  Kant  explicitly  connects  the
requirement of self-guidance with the image of a release from Nature which
(acting here in the grammatical role of a subject) has 'emancipated’ the lazy
and  cowardly  people.  Contrary  to  a  widespread  understanding  of  Kant's
philosophical  views,  this  construction  does  not  allow a  strict  opposition
between reason and nature. In claiming that Nature itself  emancipates the
human being, the text situates reason as a paradoxical continuation of the
human being's natural origin. On one side, Kant appears to want to say that
it is part of nature's plan that the human being acquires reason, and hence
the possibility to guide itself. We are predetermined to become reasonable:
that is how we mature. But, by definition, this natural determination falls
short of its final goal. When Kant speaks of nature ‘releasing’ us from its
‘direction’, he claims that this natural overcoming of nature leads us to a
realm where nature no longer has a hold on us – the realm of freedom.
Consequently, there is no longer a way for Nature to ensure that we use this
freedom in a proper way. In giving up its guiding role,  Nature  leaves us
alone with our capacity to reason, allowing us to get tangled up in the dark
fields of metaphysics. The last step has to be made by the human being, who
has  to  find  out  how  to  use  its  freedom  in  a  proper  way:  a  critical
9self-examination of reason, the work of the Critiques, becomes necessary.
Even though the human being is  emancipated,  the naturally  given
structure of its ripened capacity to think requires a new form of guidance
and legislation to which it should conform. But this new form of guidance
can, by the very definition of reason's new status as an emancipated power,
be found only within reason itself. Nature can no longer help. Which means,
of  course,  that  there  is  no  natural  guarantee  of  successful emancipation,
since the very need to guide oneself  also implies the freedom to remain
under other people's ‘lifelong direction’, of not living up to the possibilities
conceded  by  nature.  This  is  the  paradoxical  result  of  a  teleology  of
emancipation.
I don't see how we can make sense of Kant's rhetoric and passion in
this text without taking into account the paradoxical position of the human
being with respect to its nature. It seems that nature has called on the human
being to emancipate itself, but, like every mother, she cannot rely on her
child to be obedient. For Kant, though, there are signs that we shall use this
freedom in the  right  way. It is not only that the rational reconstruction of
reason – the philosophical project of the Critique – allows us to understand
that we have to live up to these consequences if we want to be true to our
self-understanding as  rational  animals.  There  is  also the  speculation,  put
forth in the third thesis of Kant's ‘Idea for a Universal History’, a text he
published the same year as the essay we are discussing. He writes there:
‘For nature is not superfluous and is not wasteful in the use of its means to
attend its  ends.  The mere  fact  that  it  gave  human beings  the  faculty  of
reason and the freedom of the will based on this faculty is a clear indication
of its intent with regard to its endowments. They were intended neither to be
led by instinct, nor to be supplied and instructed with innate knowledge;
they were intended to produce everything themselves’ (AK 8:19). We will
see how this double-structure touches, and in a way contaminates, the very
idea of freedom Kant develops extensively in his critical philosophy – his
understanding of freedom as autonomy.
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The Call for Autonomy
Kant  would  not  have  pursued  the  task  of  critical  philosophy  –  i.e.,  to
establish guidelines for a  free capacity of reasoning which, because of this
very freedom, is always vulnerable to paralyzing perplexities – if he had not
thought that he had figured out a possible resolution to this paradox. The
fact of Nature's emancipation of reason does not leave reason, as it were,
utterly at a loss. On the contrary: the path that leads to a way out of the
dialectical self-misunderstandings that stump reason (the antinomy between
freedom and law, for example) is a  reflection  of this very condition. This
reflection leads Kant to a position that links freedom (and free reasoning) to
autonomy.  Even  though  we  seem  to  have  lost  something  (having  been
‘freed’ from other people's direction), we find that our new condition has its
own structure, even its own law. The result is a transition from a negative
conception of freedom to a positive, determinate one. Freedom, then, is not
just  the  absence  of  determination.  It  is  also  positively  defined  as  the
possibility of reason fully (that is, rationally) to determine itself. The fact
that nature releases the human being from its tutelage is intrinsically tied to
the obligation (if not the call or vocation) to  use  reason in the correct and
proper way. 
Seen from this perspective, the  Critiques are reflexive exercises of
reason  in  which  reason  learns  how  to  stay  earnest.  Human  reasoning
moderates  its  speculative  ambitions  and  thus  finds  its  proper  way  of
operating.  The  concept  of  autonomy is  intrinsic  to  this  conception.
Autonomy is the capacity of reason to judge according to its own measures,
and,  for  Kant,  reason  is  autonomous  by  definition:  ‘the  power  to  judge
autonomously—that is, [judging] freely (according to principles of thought
in general)—is called reason’, Kant says in the  Conflicts of the Faculties
(AK 7:27). The passage shows that Kant's idea of free reasoning has nothing
to do with the liberal conception of negative freedom. There is no such thing
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for  Kant  as  unregulated  thought.6 Free  reasoning  is  different  from
heteronymous reasoning only with respect to the source, or determination,
of  its  standards.  This  construction  is,  of  course,  normative:  autonomy
depicts an ideal, one to which our rational thinking does not always conform
—precisely  Kant's  point  in  the  text  about  Enlightenment.  But  every
judgment that claims to be reasonable in that demanding sense has to fulfill
this  requirement: it  must meet the standards that reason has legislated to
itself. 
We have reached the point from where we can see that the claim of
reason's  autonomy  pervades  the  whole  of  Kant's  philosophy.  His  more
technical philosophical theses all reflect the idea that autonomy is not just
an ideal,  but is  in fact the reality about any conduct that can properly be
called rational. In his epistemological writings, Kant argues that we are able
to  understand  nature  because  what  happens  in  science,  when  we  look
closely at it, is that reason understands itself. Science, to put it in a formula,
is reasonable for Kant not because it talks about the world out there, but
because  it  talks  about,  and  thus  represents,  the  very  way  that  reason
organizes our experience in order to make it  intelligible.  In Kant's moral
philosophy, every determination of the will  is  morally  good which takes
reason's  law  (the  categorical  imperative)  as  the  standard  measure  of  all
action. Here again, autonomy is the explicit key to an understanding of the
fact of morality. And the third Critique defends the idea that the capacity of
judgment, while not reducible to the legislative reason with which the other
two critiques are concerned, still has an autonomous sphere of legislation –
which opens it to philosophical analysis.7 To sum it up in an appropriately
ambiguous formula: for Kant, autonomy is the nature of reason.
Conditions of autonomy
6 Cf. Kant's description of the genius as someone who is not just lawless, but who gives
himself his  own  laws (AK 8:145). A good discussion of this can be found in Onora
O'Neill (2003, 13ff.). 
7 For a discussion of the role of ‘Urteilskraft’ and its relation to Kant's moral and 
theoretical philosophy, see Wieland 2001, paragraph 10.
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I have introduced the topic of Kantian autonomy by way of an analysis of
Kant's claim that Nature emancipates the human being. In order to live up to
this  expectation  of  emancipation,  Reason  has  to  find  its  proper  way  of
operating. That is what Kant's critical philosophy is about. Now, Kant is a
typical representative of traditional European philosophy in one sense: the
only way that reason can, and eventually does, find its own autonomy is
through  reasoning,  through  the  act  of  thinking.  This  is  implicit  in  the
theoretical  framework  of  Kant's  epistemological  theory,  and  it  is  made
explicit in Kant's moral philosophy.8 There is also an hint at this in his text
about  the  Enlightenment,  where  he  claims:  ‘For  this  Enlightenment,
however, nothing is  required but freedom […] namely, freedom to make
public use of one's reason in all matters’ (AK 8:36). The public use of force,
for example, is not part of that requirement. 
Kant's positive affirmation of the force of reason squares perfectly
with the polemical description of ‘sectarian philosophy’ given by Christian
Thomasius  (1655-1728),  an  early  Enlightenment  jurist,  philosopher  and
social  reformer.  Thomasius  fiercely  attacked  any  species  of  philosophy
which holds that ‘man's nature consists in thinking and that the welfare and
happiness of the whole human race depends on the correct arrangement of
thought’.9 Sectarian philosophers of that ilk, he continues, believe that ‘the
will is improved through the understanding’, and moreover ‘that it is within
human capacity to live virtuously and happily’.
Kant would, of course, have agreed with all of this. Certainly, it is
within the capacity of the human being to find its own way to a virtuous,
maybe even happy, life: the way to that is paved by thinking.  Kant knows
that thinking cannot perform magic, but he also holds that it and it alone can
show us the way to go. This capacity is constitutive of human dignity. We do
8 Kant does not deny the Aristotelian idea that it is necessary to cultivate oneself in order 
to learn to act ‘the right way’ in unforeseen situations, but there is, for him, no 
constitutive link between this habitus and the idea of morality, which is purely rational. 
To put it differently: even though freedom and moral law are ‘facts’ of reason, they are 
still facts of reason.
9 This and the following passage from Thomasius are to be found in Hunter (2000, 598).
13
not just follow authorities: we are able to judge for ourselves. 
This view, however, raises a general problem which Kant's systematic
conception of autonomy allows us to articulate. Autonomy, we have said, is
understood as reason's capacity to judge according to its own measures and
principles.  This  construction  presupposes  that  there  is  something  like  a
realm or  a  space in  which  reason  is  occupied  with  itself  alone.  This
condition is semantically reflected in Kant's repeated use of expressions like
pure reason or pure willing. These metaphors indicate that a line is drawn, a
line  that  separates  the  possible  content  of  autonomous  (reasonable)
reflection from its correlate. Empirical knowledge, for example, can only be
valid  knowledge  for  Kant  if  certain  categorical  conditions  are  met
independently of the empirical disposition of the subject. Even though Kant
calls the structure of these forms of intuition ‘subjective’, this transcendental
subjectivity  is  independent  of  our  empirical  subjectivity  and thus  should
better  be  called  ‘objective’.10 Reason  (in  the  form  of  understanding,
Verstand) is the guarantee of objectivity. In reflecting about the conditions
of possibility of such objectivity, reason just meets itself, becoming ‘pure’
reflection. 
We have seen that this sort of self-reflection is Kant's way out of the
paradox of emancipation. Even though mature reason is devoid of Nature's
guidance, it can establish its own guidelines by reflecting upon its condition.
The  notion  of  a  ‘pure’ subjectivity  encapsulates  this  solution.  The  very
structure  of  this  argument  relies  on  the  idea  that  any  non-rational
contamination of such a pure reflectivity has to be dismissed as an ‘alien’ or
‘foreign’ factor that would destroy reason's autonomy, and thus its essential
capacity to find its own way after Nature has released it from its tutelage.11 
The Cartesian motivation behind this aspiration to ‘purity’ is evident.
In the name of the autonomy of reason, everything that is  thought to be
indispensable for certain cognitive and volitional tasks must be put on the
side of reason. Otherwise, the ideal of self-legislation by means of thinking
10 For a clarification on this line, see Daston and Galison (2007, 207ff.)
11 Onara O'Neill identifies the negation of ‘alien’ forces as the key point of autonomy 
(2003, 10). John McDowell uses the same metaphor in Mind and World (2000, 8).
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would be crucially undermined and underdetermined. The price to be paid
for  this  extension  of  reason  is  a  continuous  alienation  from the  human
being’s  empirical  nature.  The  whole  system  eventually  requires  the
construction of a transcendental subjectivity which is not only outside the
empirical  sphere,  but,  in  order  to  maintain  the  rational  intelligibility  of
knowledge as such, serves as its very condition. A transcendental subject is
a fine thing, because it allows one to place 'reason' and its pure acts in an
isolated  sphere  where  it  does  not  interfere  with  empirical  reality,  thus
guaranteeing at least the possibility of autonomy. But, at the same time, this
construction requires us to swallow some strong philosophical claims – for
example, about the 'thing in itself',  or about the purely rational nature of
morality. Chief among these claims, I would argue, is the problem we have
encountered in Kant's definition of the enlightenment: what exactly is the
nature of this transcendental subjectivity, which seems to be part of nature
and its teleology at the same time that it is distinct from it to the degree that
it can be called autonomous?
Michel Foucault hit upon a nice expression to capture the problem at
the heart of Kantian anthropology: the human being, as described by Kant,
is, Foucault says, an ‘empirico-transcendental double’.12 The divide between
the transcendental subject and the empirical subject is not as clear as Kant
would like to have it. There are numerous inconsistencies and tensions once
one tries to articulate their  relation.  One way to get hold of the dubious
nature  of  the  transcendental  subject  is  its  lack  of  a  body.  The  Kantian
subject, as McDowell puts it, is reduced to nothing more than a ‘mere point
of view’, a pure transcendental perspective.13 As a ‘mere’ point of view or a
fleshless  eye,  it  shares  none  of  the  material  factors  that  are  the  usual
requirements for human knowledge. The transcendental subject is neither
identical with its brain, nor with any individual body in general; it is not
even associated with a soul. The transcendental subject is a formal subject, a
formalized  notion  of  subjectivity  that  nevertheless  relies  heavily  on  the
12 Foucault (1970, chap. 9).
13 McDowell (2000, 102).
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possibility of the ‘I think’, which, Kant argues, must be able to accompany
all representations.
Such a formal notion of subjectivity was a hard sell even in Kant’s
own time.  For  us,  in  the  age  of  neuroscience,  sociology and Darwinian
biology, it is hard to believe that the body and its structure have nothing to
do with the functioning of reason.14 The Kantian insistence that the analysis
of reason has nothing to do with its ontogenesis since it is just articulating
the  form  of  a  meaningful  world  begs  the  question,  since  the  categorical
division of form and content is precisely the problem. Take, for example, the
pivotal role Kant attributes to the notion of synthesis, which he defines as
the  ‘action  of  the  understanding  on  sensibility’  (B  151).15 Synthesis  is
supposed to arrange the manifold of sense in such a way that it ‘matches' the
form  provided  by  the  understanding,  thus  rendering  it  intelligible.
Contemporary  Kantians  like  McDowell  tend  to  downplay  the  role  of
synthesis,  emphasizing  instead  the  logical  requisite  for  knowledge  to  be
traceable  to  rational concepts  and to  sensible  intuitions  (empirical
representations). But this less metaphysical presentation of Kant renders his
philosophy  much  more  commonsensical,  and  thus  misrepresents  its
conceptual  problem.  Kant's  claim is  not  only  that  we need a  categorical
system  in  order  to  understand  an  empirical  claim  at  all;  the  more
challenging  proposition  is  that  philosophical  reflection  can  reveal  the
necessary  forms of  all possible  representations,  independent  of  time and
space.  In  the absence of  this  strong claim,  the pivotal  role  of  reflection
would be undermined, making the very definition of rationality, and thus our
self-understanding as rational beings, vulnerable to the contingent influence
of 'alien'  forces such as history, chance and causal arrangements. Hume's
skepticism looms. In order to find its true autonomy, reason has to find a
place beyond the determination of the material world.
14 For the ‘cognitivist’ approach of embodied cognition, see Gallagher (2005), Evan 
Thompson (2007), and Noë (2005). The whole discussion, of course, is not new. More 
traditional philosophical approaches can be found, among others, in the works of 
Spinoza, Hegel, Wittgenstein, Merleau-Ponty, Deleuze and Foucault.
15 Cf. for a good discussion along these lines, the chapter entitled ‘Synthesis’, in Bubner 
(1992).
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The essentially atemporal structure of mind expresses Kant's solution
to the paradoxical teleology of emancipation. Thus, the problematic nature
of Kant's formal notion of subjectivity is shown particularly clearly if one
follows Kant's own conviction that it is Nature which emancipates us (or, at
least,  that  it  is  Nature which  prepares  the  way  for  us  to  emancipate
ourselves).  If  reason is  a natural gift,  it  must  be linked,  it  seems, to the
development of the organized living body. A mature reason is a reason that
has grown  with  the body, according to its intrinsic bodily teleology. And
even if we accept the idea that the resulting mind has reached, in some way,
a certain formal independence with regard to its bodily origins, the question
remains whether even this autonomy is not still structurally dependent on its
very embodiment.
We should note here that Kant is not saying that the ‘body’, or more
generally the material structure of the world, does not influence the way we
think. Kant would never have denied that; his whole ethical philosophy tries
to come to terms with the affective influence [Neigung] of the empirical
subject by its bodily nature. But he claims that this influence can be seen as
an 'alien'  force in  the aforementioned sense,  that  is,  as something which
deflects  the  way  we  think,  but  does  not  destroy,  or  even  touch,  the
constitutive norms governing the very nature of reason properly understood.
The problem is a tension that we can bring out through the opposition
of  two  claims.  For  one,  Kant  reproduces  the  classical  intellectualist
hierarchy of body and soul. He suggests that mind, even though it is in one
way or another empirically dependent on the body, supervenes on it in such
a  way that  it  can  emancipate itself  from its  bodily ties.  There might  be
influence, but there is also the possibility of a separate ('pure') terrain where
thinking regains its sovereignty—Plato's Cave is one vivid articulation of
this deeply rooted conviction of Western thought. It is not surprising, then,
that we should find a close connection between the emanicipatory idea of
Enlightenment and Kant's articulated theory of the thinking mind. 
But, on the other hand, there is also what would we could call Kant's
empiricism,  which  unremittingly  turns  the  emancipated  mind back to  its
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(empirical, and thus ‘alien' or 'foreign') origins. Contrary to Plato (or to what
is  generally  perceived  as  Plato's  position16),  Kant  takes  great  pains  to
incorporate the empiricist insight that we can only learn from nature, that we
can only learn via (in the case of science: experimental) interaction with the
world, and not by thinking alone. And so, while there might be, in Kant, the
possibility of a withdrawal from the exigencies of the world, this territory of
'pure'  subjectivity  has  no  standing  on  its  own.  Kant's  intellectualism  is
inconsistent in that it  grants our empirical nature a  necessary part  in the
constitution of knowledge. We might retreat from the world of appearances
in order to clean up our own house; but we cannot stay inside.
If  this  reconstruction  of  Kant's  central  ideas  is  right,  it  is  not
surprising that the concept of nature turns out to be the Achilles' heel of his
philosophy. Form and content have to be related to each other, there has to
be  some  kind  of  access or  connection between  them.17 For  Kant,  this
relation  and its  stability  seem to be implicitly  guaranteed  by the  natural
teleology we have distilled out of Kant's text about the Enlightenment. 
The  paradoxical  structure  of  Kant's  'solution'  to  the  problem  of
emancipation turns out to be the echo of a still more deeply rooted ‘paradox
of autonomy’, as David Forman calls it. If we take Kant seriously, we come
to the conclusion that the theory of transcendental subjectivity demands that
‘thought remains autonomous even with respect to the world from which it
gains empirical content’ – that is, ‘thought must be autonomous from the
world but also externally constrained by or, more generally, integrated into
the  world’.18 The  relation  of  body  and  mind  is  just  a  very  prominent
example where this tension comes to the fore.
In Place of a Conclusion
It  should be clear  by now that  we cannot  dispel  the paradoxes we have
encountered  simply  by  accepting  a  certain  ‘bodily’  influence  on  our
16    An alternative understanding of Plato's ‘ideas’ can be found in Wieland (1982).
17 This, of course, is exactly what Hegel argues against Kant.
18  Forman (2008, 565).
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thinking.  Such a  proposal  just  reiterates  the problematic  assumption that
there are ‘two’ spheres to begin with – two separate realms, call them body
and mind, call them thinking and empirical content. But is there a way to
think  ‘autonomy’  or,  to  return  to  the  subject  of  the  conference,  an
emancipated ‘majority’ of thought without such a supposition? 
One way to proceed would be to refuse this question. The problem of
emancipation,  and therefore of ‘majority’ and ‘autonomy’,  should not be
thought of in terms of  thinking.  Both the demand of autonomy, as well as
our criteria for its fulfillment, are relative to a certain historical movement
and have to be accepted as such. In short, Enlightenment and its ideal of
autonomy are tightly wedded to the rise of bourgeois liberalism, and if we
want to understand the political implications of ‘majority’, we have to relate
it  to  this  historical  situation.19 If  we  are  more  interested  in  the  ethical
implications,  we  should  note  the  family  resemblances  between  Kant’s
notion of a self-standing capacity to think and act and the long tradition of
ethical perfectionism and character molding.20 If we are grappling with the
epistemological  aspect  of ‘autonomous thinking’,  we should question the
underlying image of science and compare it with the reality of research that
has, of late, been receiving much attention.21 
Kant's philosophy is, as is often the case, of great use in that it gives a
philosophical intuition a strong and consequent articulation. This helps us
all the better, more than two hundred years later, to see the problems and
pitfalls associated with it. In the end, Kant's attempt to link autonomy, legal
‘majority’,  natural  ‘maturity’  and  epistemology  shows  us  that  ‘these
phenomena have no one thing in common which makes us use the same
word for all, but that they are related to one another in many different ways.
[..] For if you look at them you will not see something that is common to all,
19 I would like to thank Oliver Marchart for this reminder.
20 An alternative to the conception of autonomy could be the notion of ‘self-governance’. 
Cf. Jacobs (2003); Volbers (2009); Hadot (1981). For a discussion of perfectionism, see 
Cavell (1990), Henning (2009), and Raz (1986).
21 Cf. Rouse (2002).
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but similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that’.22
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